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upon future state legislation and court decisions, owing to the prestige
and authority over desirable policy which the Commission possesses.
In conclusion, a court desiring to extend workmen's compensation
coverage to an off-premises work break injury could reach such a re-
sult by relying on the employer benefit theory, the personal comfort
doctrine, or the contract theory. Alternatively, rather than stretch a
fact situation to fit one of these theories, a court could simply announce
the general rule that a short off-premises break that is consented to by
the employer and that is not unusual or unreasonable is part of the
work relationship. It is submitted that this latter alternative is the more
desirable because it is more consistent with a liberal policy in favor of
compensating injured workers, and because in recent years work breaks
have in fact become a part of the work relationship. It is further sub-
mitted that the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensa-
tion Laws should adopt a recommendation in favor of this rule, since
such a proposal would encourage the extension of the liberal trend.
ARNOLD E. COHEN
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—Discovery—Denial of Discovery
Pertaining to Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Standing—Mandamus
as a Means of Review—Investment Properties International, Ltd.
v. IOS, Ltd. 1—Investment Properties International, a Canadian cor-
poration, and its subsidiaries brought an action for damages against
the respondents, IOS, also a Canadian corporation, and its subsidiaries
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York.' The complaint alleged violations of section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 3 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder,'
as well as violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act.' Plaintiffs' request
for a preliminary injunction was denied on the grounds that it was un-
likely that plaintiffs would be able to establish standing and subject
matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs thereupon sought to depose certain officers
of the defendants, the examination to be limited to the threshold issues
of standing and subject matter jurisdiction. The district court, on mo-
tion by defendants, vacated plaintiffs' notice of deposition "without
prejudice to further discovery if it is determined that this Court has
jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action." Plaintiffs then sought
459 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1972). The factual description of the case given in the text
relies in part on the report of the denial of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction
in [19704971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 93,011 (S.DN.Y., April 21,
1971).
2 The district court opinion is unreported. The text follows the summary of the case
in 459 F.2d at 706.
8 15 U.S.C. 5 78j(b) (1970).
4 17 C.F.R. 5 240.10-5 (1972).
8 15 U.S.C. §5 1-7 (1970).
0 As quoted by the court of appeals in 459 F.2d at 707.
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a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
directing the district judge to reverse his decision and permit the pro-
posed discovery. The court HELD: limited discovery pertaining to
standing and subject matter jurisdiction must be allowed when factual
disputes exist concerning these threshold issues and it is otherwise
"virtually impossible to discover the facts on which jurisdiction and
standing turn": accordingly the district judge's vacation of the notice
of deposition was an abuse of discretion.' The court directed him to
vacate his order and to allow limited discovery regarding subject matter
jurisdiction and standing.
The /OS decision is significant as a clarification of the principles
and circumstances which make discovery regarding threshold issues
available to the parties, and it may be useful to parties desiring thresh-
old discovery in areas where at present such discovery is a novelty.°
Furthermore, one point in the /OS rationale may be interpreted as a
resuscitation of the theory that a question of first impression may be
grounds for granting mandamus and arguably could be utilized as
authority to expand use of mandamus as a means of reviewing issues
of first impression.°
This discussion of the /OS decision will focus on two central issues:
the propriety of the result reached by the district court in denying
threshold discovery and the appropriate grounds on which to fashion
appellate relief via mandamus. First, the case law of other circuits
regarding the availability of threshold discovery in circumstances com-
parable to those of /OS will be examined. Second, the prevailing doc-
trine regarding threshold discovery in the Second Circuit will be
examined, and an argument presented that that doctrine, properly
applied, required the granting of threshold discovery to the parties
seeking it in the instant case. Third, the grant of mandamus in 105
will be evaluated in terms of the judicial standards that govern the issu-
ance of mandamus. Finally, the /OS court's use of mandamus will be
found correlative with the policies of liberal discovery and judicial
economy.
Propriety of Threshold Discovery
The district court denied plaintiffs the use of depositions to in-
vestigate factual matters relating to standing and subject matter juris-
diction. The question immediately arises whether such a ruling is
correct in view of the policy of liberal discovery of relevant facts
which is one of the cardinal aims of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
7 Id. at 707-08.
8 See, e.g., note 102 infra.
° Indeed, a recent decision by the Second Circuit denying mandamus recently pre-
vailed over a forceful dissent urging issuance of mandamus to meet issues of first impres-
sion, Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Stewart, Nos. 73-1250, 73-1251 (2d Cir., Mar. 16,
1973). The dissent relied on /OS as a basis of its decision. Slip Op. at 2349.
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dure." The Supreme Court has declared, albeit in dicta, that "[t]he
various instruments of discovery" should be utilized "for the parties
to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before
trial."" To achieve the goal of fullest possible knowledge, it is essen-
tial "that the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad
and liberal treatment."" It is true that under Rule 26(c) 18 the district
court, on motion of a party and for good cause shown, has the power
to deny the discovery. However, the record in the instant case is silent
concerning any "good cause shown" for such a denial;" the district
court apparently based its ruling on the discretionary powers given
the judge in Rule 26(c). If in fact that is the case, and the effect on
plaintiffs is prejudicial, the order may be deemed an abuse of discretion,
correctable by a writ of mandamus."
Following the introduction of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in 1938, the courts were initially of the opinion that depositions under
Rule 26 could not be permitted until jurisdiction had been established.°
This view met with disapproval in Urquhart v. American -La France
Foamite Corp.'? In Urquhart, plaintiffs sought to take depositions con-
cerning factual issues raised in defendant's affidavits denying jurisdic-
tion. The district court refused the discovery on the ground that Rule
26(a) permits discovery only after jurisdiction has been established,
and granted defendant's motion to dismiss." On appeal, the Court of
10 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); 4 J. Moore, Federal Practice 11 26.69,
at 26-493. (2d ed. 1972) Chereinafter cited as Moore]. "An order that the deposition shall
not be taken is a drastic order, seldom entered since its extensive use would defeat the
broad aims of discovery . . . ." F. James, Civil Procedure 219 (1965).
11 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).
12 Id. at 507. The Court continued: "Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts
gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may
compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession." Id. "Disgorgement"
is precisely what the IOS plaintiffs sought by their discovery. See note 26 infra.
18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) provides:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and
for good cause shown, the court ... may make any order which justice requires
to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or un-
due burden or expense including one or more of the following: (1) that the
discovery not be had • ...
14 The "good cause shown" under Rule 26(c) is usually an abuse of the processes
of discovery, such as harassment of the opposing party, undue delay, or failure to abide
by the discovery rules. 4 Moore 1 26.69, at 26-499 to 26-503.
15 Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 111 (1964).	 •
16 See Fox v. House, 29 F. Supp. 673, 675 (BD. Okla. 1939). See also the discussion
of the lower court decision in Urquhart v. American-La France Foamite Corp., 144 F.2d
542, 544 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
17 144 F.2d 542 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 783 (1944).
15
 As recounted in 144 F.2d at 543-44. The court quoted Rule 26(a) as it read at
that time: "By leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant
or over property which is the subject of the action . . . , the testimony of any person
. . . may be taken at the instance of any party by deposition . . . ." Id. at .543. The
relevant portion of Rule 26(a) now reads: "Parties may obtain discovery by one or more
of the following methods: depositions upon oral examination or written questions . . . ."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a).
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Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that this interpreta-
tion was erroneous: "In many cases it would in effect make it impossible
for a plaintiff to obtain counter-evidence against the defendants' affi-
davits!'" The court stated that the district court "should ordinarily
grant leave to the plaintiff to take depositions on the issues of fact,
if any, raised by the motion [to dismiss] . . . !'" The Urquhart court
further stated that "in view of the terms of the affidavits it is likely
that permission would have been granted to take depositions had the
court thought it had power to do so."21 That the circuit court did not
share the district court's uncertainty regarding power is evinced by
its ruling that threshold discovery may properly precede definitive
establishment of the court's jurisdiction. However, the Urquhart court
stated in dictum: "We recognize that the [district] court has discre-
tion under Rule 43 (e) to decide on affidavits alone such a motion to
dismiss as the one we are considering here."" The question presented
in /OS, then, is whether this discretionary power to decide threshold is-
sues on affidavits (or oral testimony) may be exercised by the district
court when one of the parties has requested discovery pertaining to
the threshold issues. The Urquhart opinion implies that where factual
questions concerning threshold issues are disputed in the affidavits,
the threshold discovery should be allowed."
The notion that a district court can deny a party threshold dis-
covery and proceed to trial on the merits of the threshold issues has
been explicitly rejected by the First Circuit. In Surpitski v. Hughes-
Keenan Corp.," the plaintiff filed interrogatories to one of the defen-
dants in an effort to establish the court's jurisdiction; the defendants
countered with a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. The
district court requested affidavits on the merits of the jurisdictional
issues. After weighing the affidavits, the court denied additional inter-
rogatories" sought by plaintiff and granted defendants' motion to
dismiss. On appeal, the First Circuit reversed:
A plaintiff . . . should not be required, unless he has been
undiligent, to try such an issue on affidavits without the bene-
10 144 F.2d at 544.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. Rule 43(e) reads: "When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record
the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the
court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or deposi-
tions." Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(e). Rule 43(e) stands as promulgated in 1938.
28
 The Urquhart case has been cited in support of this proposition. See, e.g., Savage
v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 6 F.R.D. 311, 312 (ED. Pa. 1946) ; Silk v. Siding, 7 F.R.D. 576,
577 (E.D. Pa. 1947). Indeed, when factual questions bearing on the court's jurisdiction
are extremely complicated, the court may refuse to dedde the jurisdictional question on
affidavits alone. See Goldstein v. Compudyne Corp., 262 F. Sum. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
In Goldstein, the court itself decreed that the parties undertake discovery proceedings
to further develop the jurisdictional issues. Id. at 528.
24 362 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1966).
25 Defendant answered the first interrogatories. Id. at 255.
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fit of full discovery . . . . [P]laintiff was certainly entitled
to file such further interrogatories as were reasonably neces-
sary and, if he wished, to take depositions."
The Surpitski court thus allowed a party a discovery "of right" on
threshold issues, presuming, of course, that there are issues of fact
to be probed by the discovery.
In H.L. Moore Drug Exchange, Inc. v. Smith, Kline & French
Laboratories,' the Second Circuit, the same circuit that decided the
instant case, seemingly accepted the doctrine of Urquhart and Sur-
pitski, stating that "when a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction, either party should be permitted to take depositions on
the issues of fact raised by the motion . . . ." 2° Plaintiff had sought
to depose defendant in the face of defendant's•motion to dismiss for
want of jurisdiction. The district court found that there were no issues
of fact raised by the clash of opposing affidavits on the jurisdictional
issue and granted defendant's motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed, stating that the finding of no factual disputes
which would warrant discovery was within the "broad discretion in
the trial court which should not be overruled without a showing of
abuse."29 It agreed with the district court that only "a very strained
reading of defendant's affidavits" could create a bona fide issue of
face° Thus the denial of threshold discovery was appropriately sus-
tained in Moore Drug. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit plainly con-
templated the availability of threshold discovery when jurisdictional
facts are in dispute, and implied that a district court's denial of
threshold discovery when jurisdictional facts are sharply disputed is
an abuse of discretion8 1
A similar problem arose in /OS when the plaintiffs sought to
invoke the court's jurisdiction under section 27 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934." Since the defendants had structured their opera-
26 Id. The Surpitski court qualified its opinion by stating that plaintiff was a "total
stranger" to the defendant corporation. Id. In /OS the officers of plaintiff corporation
were formerly in IOS' employ. See Investment Prop. 'nig, Ltd. v. IOS, Ltd., [1970-1971
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. if 93,011, at 90,730 (S.D.N.Y., April 21, 1971).
However, plaintiffs alleged that defendants had exclusive control of information that
would establish the court's jurisdiction. Brief for Appellant at 8, Investment Prop. Intl,
Ltd. v. IOS, Ltd., 459 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1972). Thus, while the /OS plaintiffs are not
total strangers to the /OS defendants, it is the allegation of defendant's exclusive control
of information pertaining to jurisdiction that makes threshold discovery all the more
important. Cf. Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 456 F.2d 225, 229 (5th Cir. 1972).
27 384 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1967).
28 Id. The District Court opinion is unreported.
29 Id.
80 Id, at 98. This point was more recently emphasized in Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 319 F. Supp• 1256, 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
91 A similar conclusion regarding threshold discovery to probe improper venue was
reached by Hayashi v. Red Wing Peat Corp., 396 F.2d 13, 14 (9th Cir. 1968). See note 41
infra. See also Autera v. Robinson, 419 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
22 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
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tions to prevent sale of their stock to any United States citizen in
any domestic securities market," the plaintiffs were initially faced
with a jurisdictional hurdle. In order to establish jurisdiction under
the Securities Exchange Act, it must be shown that the allegedly
fraudulent stock transactions had caused "significant impact" on
United States securities markets or on domestic investors."
Upon filing their complaint, the plaintiffs also sought a prelimi-
nary injunction to restrain defendants' allegedly damaging conduct."
Thus, at a very early stage of the proceedings, the district court was
faced with questions of whether the plaintiffs had demonstrated juris-
diction to support a preliminary injunction." In refusing the injunc-
tion, Judge Frankel expressed "profound doubts" concerning plaintiff's
standing and the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. To his mind,
the doubts precluded the issuance of so drastic a remedy as a pre-
liminary injunction.a 7
 However, Judge Frankel also stated that he
had no desire to foreclose inquiry on these matters and that "perhaps
plaintiffs could profit from discovery.""
It is against this background of substantial factual dispute re-
garding the threshold issues that plaintiffs sought the limited discovery
which Judge Bonsai denied in the district court decision in /OS."
Of course, plaintiffs could have gone forward to trial on the merits
of the jurisdictional issue; conceivably, plaintiffs' affidavits or oral
testimony might have been sufficient to show jurisdiction. Realisti-
cally, however, judging by the "very substantial doubts" expressed
in the earlier decision denying the injunction," such a course must
have seemed unlikely to succeed unless plaintiffs could supplement
their initial contentions with the relevant information which they
claimed to be in defendants' exclusive control. It would appear, then,
that Judge Bonsal's denial of discovery under these circumstances
disregarded both the earlier decisions in Urquhart, Surfritski, and
Moore Drug and the policy of liberal discovery practice expressed in
the Federal Rules. The information-gathering functions of discovery
can certainly contribute to probing such factual disputes as those in
/OS, which turned on information in the exclusive control of the de-
88 [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 93,011, at 90,736.
04 Id. at 90,735. See generally Comment, Offshore Mutual Funds: Extraterritorial
Application of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 13 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 1225
(1972).
88 [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 93,011, at 90,728.
88
 Id. at 90,729.
87 Id. The court also said: "[Ilf it were necessary or appropriate to render a final
decision now, both of these points would go for defendants." Id. The existence of "sub-
stantial factual disputes" regarding the threshold issues was in itself a factor against
issuing the preliminary injunction. Id. at 90,733.
88 Id.
89 459 F.2d at 707. See also notes 26, 36 supra. Judge Frankel presided over the
request for a preliminary injunction. Eight months later the main action came up before
Judge Bonsai.
40 [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 93,011, at 90,740.
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fendants alleged to be essential to a showing of jurisdiction under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934" In /OS, then, the district court's
denial of threshold discovery" thwarted the exploration of allegedly
crucial factual material and stands in sharp contrast to the spirit of
liberality mandated by the Supreme Court for the practice of the federal
discovery procedures."
Appropriateness of Mandamus as a Means of Review
After the district court denied discovery, the /OS plaintiffs were
faced with the probability of dismissal on jurisdictional grounds. As-
suming that the plaintiffs awaited action of the district court on the
merits of their jurisdictional claims, the probable dismissal would
provide the basis for an appeal from a final judgment. The decisions
in Urquhart and Surpitski indicated that their prospects on appeal
would be fairly good," and Moore Drug had shown the Second Circuit
to be in favor of allowing threshold discovery when facts concerning
threshold questions are disputed." However, appeal from a final judg-
ment was taken in Urquhart and Surpitski because the actions them-
selves were dismissed simultaneously with the denial of discovery."
In 105, on the other hand, the threshold discovery was denied at a
41 One court has stated that discovery should be permitted on a motion to dismiss
for improper venue "where discovery may be useful in resolving issues of fact . . . and
the relevant evidence is peculiarly within the movant's possession." Hayashi v. Red
Wing Peat Corp., 396 F.2d 13, 14 (9th Cir. 1968).
42 Moreover, the danger of abuse of the discovery processes by the SOS plaintiffs
seems small: the discovery was expressly limited to the threshold issues, and the district
court possesses a formidable arsenal of sanctions under Rule 26(c) to restrain improper
discovery. The pertinent sanctions under Rule 26(c) are "(1) that the discovery not be
had; (2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including
a designation of the time or place; . (4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or
that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters . ..." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
For the portion of Rule 26(c) describing the conditions under which these sanctions can
be invoked, see note 10 supra. Presumably these sanctions are adequate to satisfy doubts
which might arise with regard to possible abuse of threshold discovery, e.g., "May a
litigant file a complaint which on its lace is insufficient for subject matter jurisdiction
and . . . stall off summary judgment so as to pursue discovery which may or may not
turn up jurisdictional facts [?j" Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 456 F.2d 225, 232 (5th
Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion).
48 See Hickman v Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).
44 See text at notes 16-26 supra.
45 However, the discussion in Moore Drug favoring threshold discovery, 384 F.2d
at 97, was dictum. Furthermore, after the trial is over, a court of appeals, as in Moore
Drug, is customarily reluctant to review interlocutory rulings of the district court judge.
See 4 Moore II 26.83[101, at 26-627 to 26-632.
40 The fact that there was no motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction in IOS
has no bearing on the question of whether the proposed discovery was justified. It would
appear, on the basis of the cases discussed in text at notes 16-31 supra, that factual
disputes on threshold issues necessitate allowance of the threshold discovery. See also Blair
Holdings Corp. v. Rubenstein, 159 F. Supp. 14, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). Nevertheless, the
district court denied the proposed discovery "without prejudice to further discovery if it




stage preceding final judgment, and theoretically the plaintiffs could
still litigate on the jurisdictional issues. However, by doing so they
would subject themselves to burdensome expense and delay,'" and
moreover they might reasonably fear that willingness to go forward to
trial could be construed on appeal as rebutting the claim that they
were harmed by the denial of threshold discovery 4 8 Therefore, given
the fact that other alternatives were available, it is not surprising
that the plaintiffs avoided the final judgment path.
Two avenues of interlocutory review were available to the plain-
tiffs: discretionary review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b),° and manda-
mus under 28 U.S.C. § 1651, the All Writs Act." Review under
section 1292 (b), however, allows courts of appeals to exercise a dis-
cretionary jurisdiction over an appeal from an interlocutory order
of district courts only when the district judge is willing to certify
the disputed question of law; 81 and one court has ruled that an order
granting discovery of documents cannot be considered as involving
a controlling question of law." Furthermore, the plaintiffs may have
been reluctant to utilize this process of interlocutory review since
47 Cf. Bell v. Swift & Co., 283 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1960).
48 The reluctance of appellate courts to engage in interlocutory review of rulings
by the trial court appears to be heightened upon the appeal of the final judgment. See
Address of Judge Waterman, 20 F.R.D. 420, 422-23 (1961). Appellate courts are inclined
to avoid reversing the final judgment and imposing a second trial because of an er-
roneous denial of discovery. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Hayden,
231 F.2d 595, 606 (9th Cir. 1956). A showing of harm or substantial prejudice is required
of the appellant. Id. In the instant case, the appellants did not know what the specific
results of the anticipated discovery would be. See note 23 supra. This very ignorance
would have made it harder to show the exact way in which the denial of the discovery
was harmful and prejudicial. See Developments in the Law—Discovery, 74 Harv. L.
Rev. 940, 993 (1961).
40 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970) provides:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves
a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for dif-
ference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in
such order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an
appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days
after the entry of the order: Provided, however, That application for an appeal
hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge
or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.
Bo 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970). This Act empowers federal courts to issue "all writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages
and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970).
81 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970), quoted in note 49 supra.
52 United States v. Woodbury, 263 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir. 1959). Also, it has been
contended that the resolution of minor controversies regarding discovery fails to meet
the statutory standard of "materially advancringl the ultimate termination of the
litigation." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970). See 4 Moore II 26.83 19.-21, at 26-608 to 26-613.
However, it should he pointed out that when the district court has denied a discovery,
as in the instant case, and the denial is deemed to be erroneous, a certified appeal cor-
recting the erroneous denial may avoid the need for a second trial and thus will serve
the statutory purpose of materially advancing the ultimate termination of the litigation.
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it would have required the exercise of discretion by a trial judge
who had already exercised his discretion against the plaintiffs in deny-
ing discovery. 53
Thus, with defeat on the merits of the jurisdictional issue ex-
tremely likely and the prospects for section 1292(b) interlocutory
relief poor, it is not surprising that plaintiffs chose to petition for
mandamus. If Judge Bonsal's order was demonstrably erroneous and
prejudiced plaintiffs' efforts to show subject matter jurisdiction, thereby
making eventual dismissal inevitable, it was arguably an abuse of
discretion. Therefore challenging the order by a petition for manda-
mus appeared more appropriate than an appeal under 1292 (b)."
Writs of mandamus were originally common law writs;" at pres-
ent they are issued by federal appellate courts under the authority of
the All Writs Act." As forceful commands to inferior courts, "[t]he
peremptory common-law writs are among the most potent weapons
in the judicial arsenal.” 57 The Supreme Court has continually stressed
the summary nature of mandamus and has urged that courts of ap-
peals exercise great restraint in employing the writ." The Court has
emphasized that writs of mandamus "may not be used to thwart the
Congressional policy against piecemeal appeals”" embodied in the
final judgment rule.°° "Courts faced with petitions for the peremptory
68 459 F.2d at 706.
54 The suggestion that mandamus be used to compel certification has been rejected
by the Fifth Circuit. Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 322
F.2d 113, 115 (5th Cir. 1963). Since 1292(b) certification is discretionary, an improper
denial by the district court would have to reach the level of an abuse of discretion or
reversible error to warrant appellate intervention. In such a case the better practice would
be to deal directly with the substance of the dispute through mandamus. Little purpose
would be served by issuing mandamus to compel the mere formality of certification. Such
a cumbersome procedure would utilize mandamus to compel certification of a ruling
that might be ultimately vindicated as correct. See Note, Appealability in the Federal
Courts, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 351, 382 (1962).
55 For a history of the evolution in the common law writs under the All Writs Act,
see 9 Moore 11 110.26, at 275-86.
56 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970) is quoted in note 50 supra.
57 Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 107 (1967).
58 "As extraordinary remedies, [mandamus, prohibition, and injunction against
judges] are reserved for really extraordinary causes." Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S, 258,
260 (1947). See generally 9 Moore 1111 110,27-.29.
59 Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 520-21 (1956). The writ may not be used
as "a mere shortcut for appeal." Bank Line Ltd. v. United States, 163 F.2d 133, 137 (2d
Cir. 1947).
69 The final judgment rule provides that appeals from interlocutory rulings of a
district court are to be taken only in a unified appeal from the final judgment in the
trial court action. As codified in 28 U.S.C. 1291 (1970) the rule provides: "The courts
of appeals shalt have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts
of the United States ...." See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 322, 324-27 (1940);
see generally 9 Moore 1111 110.06-.08. One commentator has suggested that the high
value accorded to the final judgment rule arises from concern that the appellate courts
would be overwhelmed by petitions for interlocutory relief should the operation of the
rule be relaxed. Crick, The Final Judgment Rule as a Basis for Appeal, 41 Yale L.J.
539, 551 (1932). See generally Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals:
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writs must be careful lest they suffer themselves to be misled by
labels such as 'abuse of discretion' and 'want of power' into interlocu-
tory review of nonappealable orders on the mere ground that they
may be erroneous."" However, the use of writs of mandamus for
certain instances of interlocutory review need not be viewed as in-
herently antithetical to the purposes of the final judgment rule. Indeed,
the goals of the All Writs Act and the doctrine of finality have been
called similar, if not identical: to ensure "efficient functioning of the
judicial system so that the parties may obtain a timely decision and
terminate the litigation." 82 Within these restraining guidelines, courts
of appeals engage in a continuing struggle to define those "extraor-
dinary" occasions where mandamus is a proper remedy and not an
evasion of the final judgment rule °3
The leading Supreme Court case discussing the application of
writs of mandamus to district court rulings on discovery motions is
Schlagenhauf v. Holder." In Schlagenhauf, the Court vacated the
Seventh Circuit's denial of a petition for mandamus and remanded
the case to the district court. The Court declared that writs of man-
damus are "appropriately issued . .. where there is 'usurpation of
judicial power' or a clear abuse of discretion . . . ."° 5 The petitioner's
basic allegation was that the district court lacked power to order him
The Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 542
(1969).
01 Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 98 n.6 (1967).
62 Comment, Mandamus Proceedings in the Federal Courts of Appeals: A Com-
promise with Finality, 52 Calif. L. Rev. 1036, 1048 (1964). A balance must be struck:
Just as indiscriminate use of the extraordinary procedure can create a burden
upon the courts of appeals, the rigid application of the final judgment rule will
result not only in undue expense to the litigants but in a burden upon the
already overcrowded trial courts where the merits of the action must be tried
twice should the trial court's determination be erroneous.
Id. Fears that the appellate dockets will be overwhelmed may be allayed by the fact
that any petition for mandamus that is frivolous or is predicated on an obvious attempt
at delay may be denied outright. Fed. R. App. P. 21(b).
68 Recognizing that "sometimes the granting of mandamus may bring about the
review of a case as would an appeal," 389 U.S. at 108 (Black, J., concurring), procedural
requirements might be attached to requests for mandamus. It has been held that relief
by extraordinary writ, such as the writ of mandamus, should be conditioned on previous
attempts by the petitioning party to secure interlocutory review under § 1292(b). Ex
parte Watkins, 260 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1958). The Fifth Circuit has refused to issue
writs of mandamus until the alternatives to mandamus, such as § 1292(b), have been
invoked by the petitioner and denied by the court. In re Humble Oil & Refining Co.,
306 F.2d 567, 568 (5th Cir. 1962); Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806, 813 (5th Cir.
1965). Two circuits have suggested that petitions for mandamus be postponed until
§ 1292(6) certification has been sought and refused. Mohasco Indus., Inc. v. Lydick,
459 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1972); In re GAF Corp., 416 F.2d 1252 (1st Cir. 1969). How-
ever, the Seventh Circuit has rejected the idea of preconditioning mandamus on a prior
application for § 1292(b) relief, reasoning that the availability of mandamus as im-
mediate and extraordinary relief should not be impaired by technical requirements.
Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. LeMay, 448 F.2d 1341, 1346 (7th Cir. 1971).
04 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
66 Id. at 110.
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to submit to physical and mental examinations under Rule 35 (a),"
The Court stated:
That [the basic allegation of lack of power] was substantial
is underscored by the fact that the challenged order requiring
examination of a defendant appears to be the first of its kind
in any reported decision in the Federal Courts under Rule
35 . . . .67
The basic allegation of lack of power, then, is the bedrock of the
mandamus in Schlagenhauf. The presence of issues of first impression
regarding the construction of Rule 35 enhances but does not of itself
constitute sufficient grounds for allowing a writ of mandamus to is-
sue." While it is true that the Court did draw attention to the issue
of first impression in Schlagenhauf, its statements must be viewed
in context:
We recognize that in the ordinary situation where the
sole issue presented is the district court's determination that
"good cause" has not been shown for an examination, man-
damus is not an appropriate remedy, absent, of course, a
clear abuse of discretion. Here, however, the petition was
properly before the court on a substantial allegation of usur-
pation of power in ordering any examination of a defendant,
an issue of first impression that called for the construction
and application of Rule 35 in a new context. The meaning
of Rule 35's requirements of "in controversy" and "good
cause" also raised issues of first impression. In our view, the
Court of Appeals should have also, under these special cir-
cumstances, determined the "good cause" issue, so as to
avoid piecemeal litigation and to settle new and important
problems.69
In sum, the attention given to the issues of first impression in Schlagen-
hauf should not be allowed to obscure the clear intent of the Supreme
Court to require a substantial allegation of usurpation of power"
00 Id. Fed. R. Civ. P. 35(a) (1964) read:
In an action in which the mental or physical condition of a party is in con-
troversy, the court in which the action is pending may order him to submit
to a physical or mental examination by a physican. The order may be made only
on motion for good cause shown .. „
87
 379 U.S. at 110.
68 See 4 Moore if 26.83 [9.-3], at 26-621 to 26-622.
69 379 U.S. at 111 (citation omitted).
" it is assumed that there is no difference between an order that lacks power and
one that usurps power. Both imply the improper assertion of a non-existent or unwar-
ranted power. The Schiagenhauf opinion seems to use the two expressions interchangeably:
see 379 U.S. at 110-11.
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or abuse of discretion"- as prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of
mandamus."
The /OS court could have rested its mandamus directly on
Schlagenhauf. The existence of case law favoring the availability of
threshold discovery" would have strongly substantiated an allegation
that the denial of discovery in the case before it constituted an abuse
of discretion. The presence of sharp factual disputes in /OS accen-
tuated the appropriateness of discovery74 and underscored the dele-
terious effect of the district court's order. Instead of relying solely
on Schlagenhauf, however, the /OS court chose to refer in its rationale
to an interpretation of Schlagenhauf advanced by an earlier Second
Circuit decision, American Express Warehousing, Ltd. v. Transamerica
Insurance Co."
In American Express, the district court ordered production of
documents authored by agents of a party's attorney. The party ap-
pealed, claiming that the interlocutory ruling infringed the attorney-
client privilege" and had a final effect that could be appealed under
the collateral order doctrine. 77
 Alternatively, the party petitioned for
vacation of the order by writ of mandamus. 78 The court held that
71 The Schlagenhauf Court does not specifically discuss "abuse of discretion" except
to indicate that it is on an equal footing with "usurpation of judicial power." Id. at
110. Justice Harlan suggests that usurpation of judicial power is for all practical purposes
"tantamount" to abuse of discretion. Id. at 127-28 (dissenting opinion). In WM, Justice
Black has suggested dropping the usurpation of power/abuse of discretion distinction
altogether, in favor of mandamus issuing to meet "exceptional circumstances" only. 389
U.S. at 108 (concurring opinion).
72
 Indeed, Justice Harlan, dissenting in Schlagenhauf, stated that any approval of
issues of first impression as bases for mandamus was unwise because it could easily lead
to overuse of the extraordinary writs:
I find it hard to escape the conclusion that this decision may open the door to
the extraordinary writs being used to test any question of "first impression," if
it can be geared to an alleged lack of "power" in the district court. As such it
seems to me out of keeping with the rule of "finality" . .
379 U.S. at 129.
78 See text at notes 16-31 supra.
74
 The presence of these factual disputes met the criteria advanced by the Second
Circuit in H.L. Moore Drug Exchange, Inc. v. Smith, Kline & French Laboratories, 384
F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1967), discussed in text at notes 27-31 supra.
75 380 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1967).
78 Specifically, the alleged consequence of the order was interference with the at-
torney's work product. Id. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). See generally
4 Moore, If1 26.63-.64.
77
 380 F.2d at 280. The collateral order doctrine was expounded in Cohen v. Ben-
eficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The doctrine allows immediate appeal from
an order which is collateral to the main litigation when the practical effect of the order
is final and could not be repaired by any subsequent appeal. See generally 4 Moore
26.8316]. However, in 105 the contested discovery might be considered essential to
plaintiffs' case rather than collateral.
78
 380 F.2d at 278. In the Second Circuit the interlocutory appeal would, in an
appropriate case, be treated as a petition for mandamus. International Prod. Corp. v.
Koons, 325 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1963).
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the order could not be appealed and denied the mandamus, prefacing
its discussion of mandamus with the following statement:
When a discovery question is of extraordinary signifi-
cance or there is extreme need for reversal of the district
court's mandate before the case goes to judgment, there are
escape hatches from the finality rule: a certification by the
district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), apparently not
sought here, or an extraordinary writ."
In order to determine the appropriateness of mandamus, the American
Express court interpreted Schlagenhauf as follows: "[T]he touch-
stones named by the Court of review by mandamus are usurpation of
power, clear abuse of discretion and the presence of an issue of first
impression."" The drawback to this summary of Schlagenhauf is that
it could be interpreted to mean that the existence of "an issue of
first impression" is a factor equal to and independent of "usurpation
of power" or "abuse of discretion" as a ground for issuance of man-
damus. The implication that mandamus can issue in response to any
issue of first impression is of course incorrect when tested by the
Schlagenhauf rationale, but unfortunately the court's statement—in
conjunction with the fact that the court nowhere explicated or indeed
further referred to that statement—may be read to suggest such an im-
plication." Until the 10S decision, however, this implication remained
unnoticed, as might have been expected since American Express
neither allowed the interlocutory appeal nor issued mandamus. More-
over, with one very recent exception each subsequent citation of
American Express, except /OS, invoked the opinion to deny an appeal
from an interlocutory ruling that was claimed to have a final effect
under the collateral order doctrine.82
79 380 F.2d at 282. In the instant case, the record reveals no effort by plaintiffs
to obtain certification from the district judge under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970). The
Second Circuit does not require a request for certification to precede a petition for
mandamus. The plaintiffs may well have felt that certification was both unlikely to be
granted and unnecessary for mandamus purposes.
80 380 F.2d at 283.
81 The American Express opinion makes no reference to the need for any "gearing"
of the alleged question of first impression with a lack of power in the court; see note 72
supra. The absence of any such reference suggests that an important issue of first im-
pression can justify a grant of mandamus. Another circuit favors a "cumulation of
factors," such as issues of first impression and basic undecided questions. United States v.
Hughes; 413 F.2d 1244, 1248 (5th Cir. 1969). The Hughes opinion did not mention abuse
of discretion or usurpation of power by the district court. Both opinions, strictly speak-
ing, are therefore incorrect on the basis of Schlagenhauf and Will, discussed in text at
notes 83-94 infra. See also In re Ellsberg, 446 F.2d 954 (1st Cir. 1971); United States
v. United States Dist. Ct., 444 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
82 Alart Assoc. v. Aptaker, 402 F.2d 779, 781 (2d Cir. 1968) (district judge's assess-
ment of preliminary costs is not an occasion for appeal under collateral order doctrine);
Clark v. Kraftco Corp., 447 F.2d 933, 936 (2d Cir. 1971) (denial of motion for sum-
mary judgment not a final judgment); see also Caceres v. International Air Transp.
Ass'n, 422 F.2d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 1970); Korn v. Franchard Corp., 443 F.2d 1301, 1305
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A few months after American Express was decided, the Supreme
Court, in Will v. United States," restated its earlier holding in Schlagen-
hauf. In Will, a criminal prosecution for tax evasion, the district court
ordered the Government to disclose information concerning oral state-
ments of the defendant relied upon by the Government to support
the charge in the indictment. The Seventh Circuit issued mandamus,
without opinion, vacating the district court's order. 84 The Supreme
Court reasoned that the district court ruling was at most an erroneous
order that was inappropriate for the "drastic" mandamus remedy."
The Government had relied on Schlagenhauf in its arguments," but the
Court said of that case:
The Court there did note that the various questions concern-
ing the construction of Rule 35 were new and substantial,
but it rested the existence of mandamus jurisdiction squarely
on the fact that there was real doubt whether the District
Court had any power at all to order a defendant to submit to
a physical examination."
The Court then went on to qualify an earlier case, La Buy v.
Howes Leather Co.," as limited to cases involving "a persistent dis-
regard of the federal rules."" La Buy had been used to support an
expansive use of mandamus where issues of first impression were con-
cerned." Viewed in light of Will, however, the standard for mandamus
in La Buy was developed not from an issue of first impression but
(2d Cir. 1971) (appeal denied in one of two cases). None of these cases involved
mandamus or § 1292(b).
But see Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Stewart, Nos. 73-1250, 73-1251 (2d Cir.,
Mar. 16, 1973), which denied a challenge by mandamus to a district court order pro-
hibiting plaintiff from taking depositions of several defendants unless they were granted
use immunity. The Stewart court cited American Express as "staging] the general rule"
for issuance of writs of mandamus. Slip Op. at 2337 n.5. The Stewart court distinguished
/OS as involving a narrow question of jurisdiction, id., and referred to "the clear policy
of denying mandamus except in the rarest situations." Id. at 2336. The dissent urged that
the case below was one of "monumental proportions," id. at 2340, and that both the
supervisory mandamus doctrine of La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957)
(discussed in text at notes 88-91 infra), and the first impression criteria of 103 were
sufficient bases for a mandamus that would bring the important interlocutory ruling
before the appellate court. Id. at 2348-49 & an. 7-8. See note 91 infra. It is submitted that
the dissent is mistaken in refusing to read the La Buy opinion as severely limited by the
Supreme Court in Will. See text at notes 83-91 infra. It is further submitted that the
Stewart majority weakens its position by failing to recognize the extent to which the
American Express opinion's reference to an issue of first impression as a base for
mandamus supports the arguments of the Stewart dissent. See text at notes 92-94 infra.
83 389 U.S. 90 (1967).
84 The circuit court order is printed id. at 94 n.3.
85
 Id. at 104.
80 Id. at n.14.
87 Id. at 104-05 n.14 (emphasis added).
88 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
80
 389 U.S. at 104-05 n.14.
" 9 Moore 11 110.28, at 313.
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from the basic question of judicial power. Accordingly it would seem
that after Will a view of mandamus as authorizing interlocutory re-
view of issues of first impression is unwarranted."
In light of the Will opinion, the suggestion in American Express
that an issue of first impression may serve as grounds for mandamus
seems clearly untenable. Nevertheless, the 105 court utilized American
Express in an effort to treat the district court's order denying thresh-
old discovery as an issue of first impression, apparently in order to
provide grounds for mandamus. After acknowledging that Judge Bonsai
had power to vacate the notices of deposition, the court reasoned
that that factor was offset by the existence of an issue of first im-
pression as well as abuse of discretion: "Nevertheless, the issue here
is one of first impression, and the vacation reveals, through its con-
sequences, an abuse of discretion."' The approach consistent with the
Will and Schlagenhauf opinions would have been to focus only on
district court conduct indicative of usurpation of power or abuse of
discretion 9 3 If any issues of first impression were raised by use of
these traditional mandamus tests, they could then be dealt with in the
writ of mandamus." Consequently, the 105 court's use of American
Express and the presence of an issue of first impression was not
necessary to sustain issuance of the writ.
Moreover, the existence of analogous cases belies the contention
that the denial of threshold discovery raises an issue of first impres-
sion. In fact, with the exception of one district court opinion° from
the early years of the Federal Rules, the district courts would appear
to be unanimously of the opinion that threshold discovery must be
91 But see Note, Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus Under the All Writs Act, 86
Harv. L. Rev. 595 (1973), where it is argued that the Will opinion can be read as
supporting a more expansive notion of "advisory" mandamus. Id. at 622. "Advisory"
mandamus, in this view, would be directed to "novel and important" questions and
would serve as an occasion to enunciate "general guidelines" for the edification of
inferior courts. Id. at 618. See Atlass v. Miner, 265 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1959), aff'd an
other grounds, 363 U.S. 641 (1960). A policy of "advisory" mandamus would thus
dispense with the traditional standards of mandamus propriety—usurpation of power and
abuse of discretion. In their place would be a roving commission for courts of appeals
to formulate rules and to respond to new and important questions as warranted by
"exceptional circumstances." See the concurring opinion of Justice Black in Will, 389 U.S.
90, 108 (1967), Although "advisory" mandamus is not necessarily subversive of the
final judgment rule, the danger of proceeding on a theory of "advisory" mandamus,
in addition to encouraging possible overuse of the writ, see note 72 supra, is that the
plain language of the Will opinion limits the La Buy doctrine to instances of "persistent
disregard of the Federal rules," 389 U.S. at 104-05 n.14, and restates the Schlagenhauf
holding as resting squarely on the traditional mandamus standard of "power". Id.
92 459 F.2d at 707-08.
93 Plainly, the abuse of discretion test would be met in the instant case. How-
ever, despite the fact that the Will opinion bristled with cautionary dicta and appeared
"to rechart the area of the availability of mandamus along quite restrictive lines," 9
Moore lf 110.28, at 308, the Will opinion has not discouraged some courts from utilizing
first impression issues as bases for mandamus. See note 81 supra.
94 Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 110-11 (1964).
05 See, e.g., Fox v. House, 29 F. Supp. 673, 675 (ED. Okla. 1939).
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allowed when there are factual disputes concerning threshold issues."
The Second Circuit has itself endorsed the appropriateness of thresh-
old discovery, implying that such discovery can be denied only on a
finding by the district court that no issues of fact have been raised
regarding the threshold issues."
However, the IOS court did not rely only on the American Ex-
press theory. The rest of its rationale is firmly grounded within the
ambit of the Schlagenhauf decision. It found that the district court's
"vacation of plaintiffs' notice of deposition reveals, through its con-
sequences, an abuse of discretion."" The harmful consequences of
the lower court order were the freezing of plaintiffs' efforts to in-
vestigate facts bearing on jurisdiction and standing, and the resultant
"limbo" in which plaintiffs find themselves." As the /OS court stated:
Discovery ... is the heart of the controversy, for on it turns
plaintiffs-petitioners' right to be in court. The order below
makes it virtually impossible to discover the facts on which
jurisdiction and standing turn, and thus puts the plaintiffs-
petitioners in a cul-de-sac which the Federal Rules never
contemplated.'"
Accordingly, the order denying discovery is an abuse of discretion, and
mandamus must issue.
The /OS decision, except for the reference to first impression
elements from American Express, is wholly in keeping with the policies
of judicial economy and liberal discovery. Plaintiffs' petition for man-
damus raised the question of abuse of discretion at the moment the
alleged abuse occurred. The granting of mandamus in such a case
ensures timeliness and efficiency of district court decisions and thereby
confirms the principles of the final judgment rule by preventing "un-
needed delay and expense caused by multiple appeals in the same .
suit."1o1 The mandamus promotes an economy of judicial effort by
obviating the need for a reversal of the offensive order on appeal, and
a consequent second trial; furthermore, it ensures that the liberal
discovery policies of the Federal Rules are fully implemented. Finally,
since the IOS mandamus pertains to the correction of harmful error
regarding the administration of a limited and specific area of dis-
covery practice, it cannot be construed as portending a general as-
sault on the final judgment rule or on the discretion of the district
courts to enter interlocutory rulings.'"
99 See text at notes 16-31 supra.
97 H.L. Moore Drug Exchange, Inc. v. Smith, Kline & French Laboratories, 384
F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1967).
D 8 459 F.2d at 707.
99
 Id. at 708..
100 Id. at 707.
for Comment, Mandamus Proceedings in the Federal Courts of Appeals: A Com-
promise with Finality, 52 Calif. L. Rev. 1036 (1964).
192 This is not to say that the SOS decision may not provide support for granting
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In conclusion, the mandamus in /OS was an appropriate response
to the restrictive order issued by the district court. That order, deny-
ing threshold discovery, was inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal
Rules and contrary to the holding of several opinions that affirm the
propriety of threshold discovery under circumstances analogous to
/05."3
 In 10S, plaintiff chose to petition for mandamus rather than
go forward to a likely dismissal and take a subsequent appeal. While
the Second Circuit was incorrect in basing its decision, in part, on the
existence of an issue of first impression as grounds for mandamus,
nevertheless its grant of mandamus was a proper response to an abuse
of discretion. Although the authority of American Express had been
undercut by the decision of the Supreme Court in Will," the /OS
court's use of American Express was unnecessary to its holding and
does not render the mandamus unfounded. Given that the district
court order was erroneous and its consequences harmful, the order
must be deemed an abuse of discretion, and mandamus must issue to
correct it.
DOUGLAS M. MYERS
discovery in instances where such grants might be challenged. For example, the opinion
implies that discovery should be made available to probe the $10,000 amount in con-
troversy requisite for diversity jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970)), 459 F.2d at
707. Usually, plaintiff's threshold dollar claim is assumed to have been made in good
faith. Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938). How-
ever, either the court or the defendant may challenge plaintiff's jurisdictional amount,
whereupon the burden is on plaintiff to show the sufficiency of his claim. McNutt v.
GMAC, 298 U.S. 178, 182-89 (1936). It is within the discretion of the district court
to determine the appropriate method of proof. Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 71-72 (1939).
Affidavits, oral testimony, and depositions have been deemed available to plaintiff in the
effort to demonstrate the jurisdictional amount. Alker v. Insurance Co. of N. America,
279 F. Supp. 902, 903 (E.D. La. 1968), citing Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735 n.4
(1947). The court will make the final ruling whether the required jurisdictional amount
has been met, and it has been assumed in one recent case that pre-trial discovery is
available as a means to provide a basis for an informed ruling by the court. Nelson v.
Keefer, 451 F.2d 289, 296 (3d Cir. 1971). The logic of the /OS opinion would indicate
that a limited discovery must be allowed to either party to probe factual disputes
concerning the sufficiency of the jurisdictional amount.
1" See text at notes 16-31 supra.
104 See text at notes 83-94 supra.
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